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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : EUR - Mr. Elbrick

FROM : GER - Mr. Lyon

SUBJECT: Berlin.

DATE: May 10, 1955

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In view of the Secretary's approval of our memorandum of April 22 I would suggest that at your convenience you invite Adam Watson or Mr. Leishman, and on another occasion Mr. Grandville, and explain to them our position as set forth in NSC 5404/1, Article 9, paragraph f., and Article 8, paragraph 8. I believe that the point of departure might be the question of the excessive tolls which have recently been imposed on the Autobahn. We could explain that we are concerned about these and that we are looking well ahead to the possibility that that cannot be resolved locally or in Moscow and that we should have to perhaps employ military trucks over the road. If this failed to prove effective it might lead to further deterioration of the situation. In due course we might find our Autobahn access to Berlin cut off. We might in time find ourselves again in a blockade. While we think that the chances of this are remote, it is nevertheless a possibility. We believe that the reimposition by the USSR of a blockade or severe harassment measures to Berlin at this time would be a deliberate challenge to the Western powers' position in Berlin. The prestige of the three Western Allies will very definitely be involved. If the Soviets continue their harassing measures to restrict access to Berlin, it is important to demonstrate our firm intention not to tolerate such action. If the harassment nonetheless continues, security interests of the Allies should require them to take forceful measures to counter the Soviet challenge. Eventually in agreement with the British and the French we might have to use limited military force to the extent necessary to determine the Soviet intentions and to demonstrate our refusal voluntarily to relinquish our right of access to Berlin. Therefore we think we should consider what we would do under such circumstances. We would like to have the British and the French pass this on to their governments for comment in the hope that their governments will see the situation as we do. It might be advisable for the three Allied Military authorities in Western Germany and in Bonn to discuss what our mutual attitude would be in the event of a second blockade.

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